When one finds themselves buckling under unaffordable credit card debt, most financial planners would recommend against using another credit card to pay off those debts. Yet that is exactly what Gov. Jerry Brown did when he signed California’s new budget into law last month.

Contained within the budget is a plan worked up by Gov. Brown and State Treasurer John Chiang that greenlights the state to borrow reserve cash from state government accounts and to plow the proceeds into the California’s pension investment fund.

The idea is that the higher yielding pension fund will earn more than enough to cover both interest on the new debt and pay down some of the state’s pension obligations. Over the past two decades, several states and localities tried very similar schemes to deal with their own pension problems, but the practice is fraught with risk, and it has backfired spectacularly on more than a few occasions.

The city of Oakland, for instance, lost $250 million on a similar borrow-and-invest pension funding scheme when projected returns did not pan out. When New Jersey tried borrowing to cover pension obligations, it ended up being charged with securities fraud.

These risks do not seem to bother Gov. Brown, whose pension proposal — released as part of his “May Revision” budget and signed into law on June 27 — calls for borrowing $6 billion from a state savings account at 1.5 to 3.5 percent interest rates and investing that money in CalPERS, the state’s pension investment fund, which Brown is counting on to make 7 percent returns.

If all goes according to the governor’s plan, that $6 billion investment will be enough to save $11 billion in pension costs and pay back the state savings account. But that’s a pretty big “if,” especially given CalPERS’ recent track record.

In 2014 CalPERS had a return target of 7.8 percent. Instead, it brought in just 2.4 percent. That was bad but better than 2015’s 0.61 percent return. Last year saw returns jump to 5.8 percent, which is much better, but still far below what Brown needs.

Meanwhile, an economic downturn could wreak havoc with CalPERS’ already depressed returns. Indeed, recessions are the main reason this approach to budgeting is so inherently risky.

A comprehensive study by Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research found that states and localities that borrowed funds to cover pension obligations in the years leading up to an economic contraction overwhelmingly witnessed negative returns. CalPERS itself saw a negative 24 percent return on investment during the worst of the Great Recession.

Brown is clearly aware of this recessionary risk, saying as he announced his pension proposal that “an economic recovery won’t last forever.” So why is he pushing a proposal that depends on an ongoing economic recovery? The answer, according to that Boston College study, is necessity: Financial pressure, not fiscal wisdom, plays the biggest role in which states and localities go for this option.

California currently faces a $5.8 billion budget shortfall, forcing the governor to scramble for any savings he can find. Needless to say, that’s not how Brown justified his move. He claims his proposal would “reduce unfunded liabilities and stabilize state contribution rates.” But the sheer size of California’s unfunded pension liabilities makes the claim that this borrow-and-invest scheme will make a real difference laughable.

Estimates range, but California is looking at anywhere from $242 billion to $767 billion in unfunded pension liabilities. Even if Brown’s $11 billion in savings does materialize, that could be just .045 percent of California’s unfunded pension obligations — and that’s using the lower estimate of liabilities.

Indeed, given the scale of California’s long-term pension debt problems, Gov. Brown’s plan comes across as both desperate and ineffective, designed not as a reform to a broken system, but rather as a risky, short-term patch to keep everything afloat for one more day.

Christian Britschgi is an assistant editor at Reason.com and Reason magazine.